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Abstract 
This paper examines the effectiveness of communication on Instagram, a type of visual social net-
working site, by the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Results show that the TSA’s 
Instagram account elicited stronger emotional reactions than a private consumer product business 
Instagram account. More importantly, perceived usefulness of content, perceived persuasive intent 
of content, and negative emotions all affected attitudes toward the TSA. Additionally, perceived use-
fulness of content and negative emotions also influenced communicative action regarding the TSA 
account. Findings demonstrate the emotional impact of visual communication and the role of both 
cognitive and affective evaluations in changing attitudes and behavior regarding a government 
agency. 
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Introduction 
 
Visual social networking sites (VSNSs), such as Pinterest, Instagram, and Snapchat, have 
been gaining increasing popularity among social media users.1 According to the Pew Re-
search Center, Pinterest and Instagram usage has doubled since 2012.2 
VSNSs are even more popular among teens. A survey conducted by Piper Jaffray in 
2015 found that US teens considered Instagram their most important social networking 
site, while a survey conducted by Piper Jaffray in 2014 reported that 38 percent of teens 
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described Instagram as a favorable marketing channel to reach them, compared with Twit-
ter at 34 percent and Facebook at 21 percent.3 
The growing popularity of VSNSs is not surprising, as visual communication can be 
easier to digest and is more likely to be recalled than textual information, according to the 
dual coding theory.4,5 Research conducted by Momentus Media, for instance, finds that 
pictures and videos on Facebook generate more engagement from followers than content 
without such visuals.6 
In light of the higher levels of audience engagement with visual content, VSNSs have 
become popular channels for brands and marketers to connect with consumers.7 Such 
adoption is not confined to the private sector alone. Various government agencies at the 
federal, state, and local levels are all experimenting with VSNSs to engage with citizens. 
At the federal level in the USA, for instance, the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), the Bureau of Land Management, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the General Ser-
vices Administration, and Housing and Urban Development all maintain active Instagram 
accounts. 
While social media have been gaining popularity among government agencies, many 
still avoid it owing to the heavy demands imposed upon government resources8 and the 
vulnerability of the open social media ecosystem.9 Effective use of social media, however, 
can substantially lower the costs of content production for these channels, as well as the 
risks of adverse consequences from social media crises, thereby resulting in more optimal 
results.10 
Despite the growing adoption of VSNSs in government-citizen communication, re-
search investigating the effectiveness of social networking sites and the best content strat-
egies is still at its nascent stage. Indeed, Grabe and Myrick11 urge communication scholars 
to move beyond the written word to explore the information value of images and to re-
search the confluence of emotions and cognition in political participation and active citi-
zenship. 
The present study contributes to the emerging research literature on government use of 
VSNSs by conducting an experiment to test whether exposure to the TSA’s Instagram ac-
count versus a private consumer product business Instagram account (Reynolds Kitchens) 
results in different content evaluations and emotional reactions. It further investigates 
whether an audience’s cognitive and affective responses affect attitudes toward the TSA 
and communicative action regarding the TSA’s Instagram account. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Government use of social media 
As a result of the Open Government Initiative issued by the Obama administration in 2009, 
US federal agencies became more proactive in engaging with the public on social media.12,13 
Government agencies adopt social media by assessing three distinct factors: best prac-
tices in their informal network of peers, best practices in the public and private sectors, and 
“market-driven” citizen behavior.14 The adoption process typically goes through three 
stages.15 First is the experimental stage during which government agencies use social me-
dia outside of accepted technology use in an informal way. Then comes the stable stage 
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when experimentation gives in to order as norms and regulations are drafted. Last is the 
mature stage during which clear policies regarding appropriate behavior, types of interac-
tions, and new models of communication are formalized. 
Government use of social media contributes to a culture of transparency and openness.16 
Lee and Kwak17 proposed an open government maturity model, which contends that open 
government undergoes five maturity levels sequentially: initial conditions, data transpar-
ency, open participation, open collaboration, and ubiquitous engagement. Social media 
can facilitate and expedite this process. 
Social media can also benefit government-citizen communication in various other ways, 
such as facilitating collaboration, providing more accessible opportunities for participa-
tion, empowering users, and allowing for near real-time publishing.18 Social media enable 
more authentic interactions that can change the perception held by many publics that gov-
ernment communication is removed, distanced, or even propagandistic.19 Hence, leverag-
ing social media can also help improve attitudes toward government agencies. 
 
The Transportation Security Administration’s use of Instagram 
One government agency that needs an improvement in public attitudes is the TSA. 
Created as an agency of the US Department of Homeland Security in response to the 
September 11th attacks, the TSA oversees the security of the general public traveling in the 
USA. 
Despite its essential role in ensuring and protecting public safety, the US public does 
not hold the TSA in esteem. A 2011 Reason-Rupe survey found that while 38 percent of 
Americans held a positive view of the TSA, 43 percent held a negative view.20 Likewise, in 
2013, Frequent Business Traveler magazine found that an overwhelming 85 percent of fre-
quent flyers thought negatively of the TSA.21 
Such data suggest that the TSA needs to improve its image among the public. The 
agency has been working toward that goal partly through active communication on social 
media. 
At the time of writing, the TSA maintains three official social media accounts targeted 
at the general public: YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/tsa), Twitter (https://twit-
ter.com/tsa), and Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/tsa). Its Instagram account, in 
particular, has gained largely favorable attention in national media. 
Opened in June 2013, TSA’s Instagram account had reached 668,000 followers by the 
end of February 2017, with more than 1,100 posts. As one Esquire post notes, the pictures 
posted are a mixture of “weapons and puppies, with some drugs thrown in for good meas-
ure.”22 
To assess the dominant content type on TSA’s Instagram account, a random sample of 
images was coded (n = 50) and the majority (close to 60 percent) were found to feature 
firearms, ammunition, weapons, and other items prohibited from carry-on travel (Krip-
pendorf ‘s α = 0.81). 
When TSA’s Instagram account is discussed on blogs, the sentiment is largely positive, 
with headlines such as “The TSA’s Instagram feed is terrifying and totally awesome”23 
“Here’s why you should follow the TSA on Instagram”24 and “TSA’s Instagram account is 
a must-follow.”25 
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Hence, TSA’s Instagram account provides a unique opportunity to examine whether 
use of a VSNS by a government agency that suffers from a negative reputation can help 
improve public attitude toward the agency and stimulate positive communicative action 
regarding its social media account. The following section proposes a framework to com-
pare the effectiveness of TSA’s Instagram account and a private consumer product busi-
ness Instagram account. A consumer product business was chosen as a comparison group 
because this product category similarly targets a large number of individuals and the gen-
eral public can easily comprehend the content. 
 
Fear appeals in political communication 
Weapons typically arouse fear. Fear appeals refer to “those contents of a persuasive com-
munication which allude to or describe unfavorable consequences that are alleged to result 
from failure to adopt and adhere to the communicator’s conclusions.”26 
The use of fear appeals is a popular strategy in political communication.27,28 One of the 
most famous early examples in political advertising is the 1964 “Daisy” advertisement, 
aired as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s reelection campaign, which juxtaposed a little 
girl and a nuclear explosion. Fear was found to be present in 41 percent of campaigns ad-
verts in the 2000 elections.29 Recent public debates about terrorism,30 immigration,31 and 
climate change32 all resort to fear appeals. 
Pictures are especially powerful at evoking strong emotions, including fear. Whit Ayres, 
a political consultant and president of a national public opinion and public affairs research 
firm, observes that “most media consultants admit that their adverts have not only a direct 
message but also an implied message designed to elicit an emotion in the viewer, often 
communicated more through pictures than words.”33 In his research on the persuasive 
power of emotional appeals in political advertising, Brader34 found that much of the emo-
tional power of campaign adverts comes from images and music. The large number of 
weapons showcased on TSA’s Instagram page can be frightening,35 but the images are also 
intended to be interesting.36 Indeed, Brader’s37 research has shown that fear appeals in po-
litical communication have both cognitive and emotional impact on political judgment, 
candidate evaluations, and political information seeking. 
 
Cognitive response: Content assessment 
Mediated message processing typically entails both cognitive and emotional components.38,39 
Cognitive processing involves mental evaluations of content. Marketing messages serve 
two functions: to inform and to persuade.40 From an audience-centric perspective, mes-
sages can be perceived as (un)useful and (un)persuasive. 
The informative function renders the audience more knowledgeable about the topic, 
helping them make informed decisions. Such messages are thus perceived to be useful if 
they provide instrumental value to the audience.41 This is also known as perceived infor-
mational utility, which “constitutes one important content characteristic that may influ-
ence sharing.”42 
Government agencies routinely adopt the public information model in their communi-
cation with citizens, where the intent is to inform, just like journalists.43 Communication 
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under this model is largely one way, which is consistent with findings that one-way push 
strategies dominate government communication on social media.44,45 
To the extent that a message is useful to an individual, he or she is more likely to engage 
with the content, learn the information, develop attitudes, and carry out behavior.46–48 In-
deed, according to Bob Burns, Head of Social Media at the TSA, the goal of posting the 
pictures is to educate the public and to inform them about what the agency does.49 
On the other hand, marketing is also intended to persuade,50 even though not all per-
suasive messages may be perceived as such. While government communication is seen by 
many as propaganda persuasion,51 if other features disguise or overwhelm the persuasive 
nature of the message, the audience may not perceive it to have a high persuasive intent. 
Hence, the same message can have varying levels of perceived persuasive intent. 
Perceived usefulness and perceived persuasive intent are evaluations the public makes 
of marketing communication from both government agencies and private businesses. The 
literature has not provided conclusive evidence as to whether government communication 
(TSA, in this case) is perceived to be more or less useful than private business communi-
cation. The same is true with perceived persuasive intent of government versus private 
business communication. Hence, the following research questions are proposed: 
RQ1: Do viewers of the TSA’s Instagram account and a private consumer prod-
uct business Instagram account evaluate the perceived usefulness of the 
content differently? 
RQ2: Do viewers of the TSA’s Instagram account and a private consumer prod-
uct business Instagram account evaluate the perceived persuasive intent 
of the content differently? 
 
Affective response: Positive-negative emotions 
Visual images can potentially generate strong affective reactions.52 
The structure of affect has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. A commonly dis-
cussed model in the literature is the two-dimensional theory of affect: valence (posi-
tive/negative) and arousal (high/low arousal).53–56 Some examples of high-arousal positive 
emotions are active, elated, enthusiastic, excited, and strong; some examples of high-
arousal negative emotions are fearful, hostile, distressed, and nervous; some examples of 
low-arousal positive emotions are calm, placid, and relaxed; and finally, some examples of 
low-arousal negative emotions are drowsy, dull, sleepy, and sluggish.57, 58 
In the case of TSA’s Instagram account, the predominance of weapon imagery can gen-
erate stronger emotions than most other images shown in a private consumer product 
business account.59 As weapon images on the TSA’s account are high-arousal materials, 
they are more likely to generate high-arousal emotions. In terms of valence, as images of 
weapons are threatening, or “terrifying” as one of the above-mentioned blog headlines 
claimed,60 to most individuals, they are more likely to generate stronger negative emotions 
compared with what would normally be shown in the Instagram feed of most brands. In 
a similar vein, these images should generate weaker positive emotions, such as cheerful, 
happy, or joyful. The following hypotheses are proposed: 
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H1: Viewers of TSA’s Instagram account will report weaker positive emotions 
than viewers of a private consumer product business Instagram account. 
H2: Viewers of TSA’s Instagram account will report stronger negative emo-
tions than viewers of a private consumer product business Instagram ac-
count. 
 
The next question is why the differences in cognitive and affective responses matter for 
the TSA. It is possible that these constructs can shape public attitudes toward the TSA and 
communicative behavior regarding the TSA’s Instagram account. 
 
Impact of content assessment 
The technology acceptance model holds that perceived usefulness is one of the strongest 
predictors of positive attitudes toward new technologies and acceptance of them.61 Content 
usefulness has been shown to contribute to, for instance, the adoption of websites62 and the 
acceptance of mobile advertising.63 It has been found to be positively related to situational 
involvement with a company’s Facebook page.64 Research on viral behavior also shows 
that the public likes to pass along practical, useful content.65 Hence, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that: 
H3: Perceived content usefulness of TSA’s Instagram account will be positively 
associated with (a) attitudes toward the TSA and (b) communicative action 
regarding the account. 
 
Research in advertising reactance has shown that when the audience believes it is being 
advertised to, the messages can generate a boomerang effect where the audience actively 
rejects the messages and evaluates the source or content in a more negative light.66–68 
Reactance theory has four essential elements: freedom, threat to freedom, reactance, and 
restoration of freedom.69 Individuals cherish the free will to act without constraints. When 
they perceive a message, however, is intended to persuade them to think, feel, or act in a 
certain way, they feel threatened. As a result, they experience psychological reactance by 
resisting the persuasive message and return to their original free-will state. Hence, reac-
tance will not occur until the audience perceives the content to have persuasive intent and 
places a premium on it. A message can both be of instrumental value to the audience and 
have a persuasive intent. If the perceived usefulness of the message trumps its persuasive 
intent, then the degree of reactance is attenuated. 
Reactance can affect audience engagement with social media content. For instance, a 
recent study has shown that advertising reactance is a strong inhibitor to followers’ iden-
tification with the brand micro-blog, which in turn determines whether the followers en-
gage with the brand on the micro-blog.70 
Informed by the literature on reactance theory, it is expected that: 
H4: Perceived persuasive content intent of the TSA’s Instagram account will 
be negatively associated with (a) attitudes toward the TSA and (b) com-
municative action regarding the account. 
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Impact of emotional reactions 
Zajonc posits that emotions can cause unconscious attitudinal and behavioral change.71 
This is a well-documented phenomenon as Loewenstein and his colleagues claim that 
“the idea that emotions exert a direct and powerful influence on behavior receives simple 
ample support in psychological literature on emotions.”72 
Research on the impact of positive emotions consistently shows that individuals feeling 
positive emotions evaluate stimuli more positively.73–75 
On the other hand, both the protection motivation theory76 and the extended parallel 
processing theory77 hold that fear appeals that generate strong negative emotions can have 
powerful persuasive effects. Decades of research on fear appeals has shown that they can 
elicit behavioral change.78 
According to the affective intelligence theory,79 fear is a particularly high-arousal emo-
tion that involves detection of threat and invokes anxiety, which motivates citizens to seek 
more information about the public issue in order to alleviate that anxiety. This theory con-
siders fear as part of the surveillance system that, when triggered by a threat, breaks a 
person’s habitual moves and shifts the focus on information-gathering. In other words, 
citizens are more likely to forego previous political dispositions and evaluate risk infor-
mation in a way to reduce that anxiety.80 In summary, the affective intelligence theory pre-
dicts that fear leads to more detailed information-processing, reducing the influence of 
partisanship and prior political attitudes. 
Seeing weapons confiscated by TSA can signal to viewers that TSA has done its job right 
by preventing these lethal weapons from being brought onboard the plane to threaten the 
safety of passengers. This can lead to a more favorable assessment of the agency. Hence, 
strong negative emotions experienced as a result of seeing weapon images on TSA’s Insta-
gram account may actually induce more positive attitudes toward the TSA. 
High-arousal emotions, regardless of valence, can result in strong engagement.81,82 
Arousal stimulates a fight-or-flight response. High-arousal emotions can stimulate viral 
behavior,83 and this is especially true for negative emotions.84,85 Hence, it is expected that: 
H5: Positive emotions after viewing TSA’s Instagram account will be posi-
tively associated with (a) attitudes toward the TSA and (b) communicative 
action regarding the account. 
H6: Negative emotions after viewing TSA’s Instagram account will be posi-
tively associated with (a) attitudes toward the TSA and (b) communicative 
action regarding the account. 
 
Method 
 
Data 
To address the research questions and test the hypotheses, an online experiment was con-
ducted on Amazon’s mTurk, whose participants have been shown to be representative of 
the US population and are more diverse than college students.86 Respondents first an-
swered a series of pre-test questions before they were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions where one group viewed pictures and comments captured from 
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the TSA’s Instagram account from November 6 to December 16, 2015, while the compari-
son group viewed pictures captured from the Reynolds Kitchens Instagram account 
(https://www.instagram.com/reynoldskitchens) from November 5 to December 15, 2015. 
After viewing either Instagram account, respondents completed post-test questions before 
each one was reimbursed US$1.00 for participating in the study. 
The TSA’s Instagram account was chosen because it represented a government agency 
that had left many Americans with conflicting attitudes.87,88 Its Instagram account features 
content that is a combination of serious (such as confiscated assault weapons) and light-
hearted (such as pictures of TSA Explosives Detection Canines and food pictures related 
to holiday travel). 
It was more challenging to decide upon a private consumer product business. Reynolds 
Kitchens’ Instagram account was chosen as a comparison group because it is a nonpolitical 
account with a niche group of followers. To prevent pre-experiment exposure to stimulus 
materials from contaminating experiment results, respondents were expected not to follow 
either of these accounts. Hence, niche accounts would allow the researchers to retain the 
maximum number of eligible subjects. Reynolds Kitchens’ account features pictures of 
dishes with ingredients and recipes in the text descriptions. Moreover, scary weapons ver-
sus delicious food would both likely elicit strong emotions. 
The online experiment was fielded on February 8, 2016, and closed on the same day. 
Respondents who spent fewer than three minutes completing the study were excluded 
from the analysis. One respondent who was assigned to the Reynolds Kitchens condition 
was already following its Instagram account, and therefore this case was dropped as well. 
Ultimately, 177 responses were analyzed (nTSA = 87, nReynolds = 90). 
The whole sample was used to test the two research questions and the first two hypoth-
eses while only the TSA subsample was analyzed for H3 to H6. 
 
Measures 
 
Perceived usefulness of content 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following 
statements on a five-point Likert scale: “I feel like I was getting useful information,” “I feel 
like I was getting content of value,” and “I found the content interesting.” These items were 
averaged to create the index of perceived usefulness of content (α = 0.83, M = 3.38, SD = 0.97). 
 
Perceived persuasive intent of content 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following 
statements on a 5-point Likert scale: “I feel like I was being persuaded,” “I feel like I was 
being advertised to,” and “I feel like I was being targeted.” These items were averaged to 
create the index of perceived persuasive intent of content (α = 0.75, M = 2.33, SD = 1.00). 
 
Emotions 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt a list of 16 emotions on a 
5-point scale from “very slightly or not at all” to “extremely.” An exploratory factor anal-
ysis yielded a two-factor structure. The first factor includes eight positive emotions: cheerful, 
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happy, joyful, excited, proud, strong, confident, and bold. These items were averaged to 
create an index of positive emotions (α = 0.93, M = 2.38, SD = 1.05). The second factor sig-
nifies eight negative emotions: afraid, scared, frightened, nervous, angry, irritable, hostile, 
and disgusted. These items were averaged to create an index of negative emotions (α = 0.95, 
M = 1.58, SD = 0.85). 
 
Attitudes toward the TSA 
Respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes toward the TSA on five items by using 
a 7-point semantic differential scale: unpleasant-pleasant, unappealing-appealing, unlikeable-
likeable, bad-good, and unfavorable-favorable. These items were averaged to create an in-
dex of attitude toward the TSA (α = 0.97, M = 3.78, SD = 1.68). 
 
Communicative action regarding the TSA 
Communicative action measures communicative activeness in taking, selecting, and giving 
information.89 Respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale from “very unlikely” 
to “very likely” their willingness to (1) follow the TSA account on Instagram, (2) comment 
on the TSA account on Instagram, and (3) recommend the TSA account on Instagram to 
their friends. These items were averaged to create an index of communicative action re-
garding the TSA (α = 0.93, M = 2.25, SD = 1.62). 
 
Results 
 
Experimental effects on content assessment and affective response 
The two research questions, H1 and H2, were examined with a series of independent-samples 
t-tests. 
In response to the RQ1, respondents who viewed the TSA’s Instagram account (M = 3.24) 
and those who viewed Reynolds Kitchens’ Instagram account (M = 3.52) perceived the 
content to be similarly useful (t(171) = 1.90, n.s.). 
Regarding RQ2, respondents who viewed TSA’s Instagram account (M = 2.18) and those 
who viewed Reynolds Kitchens’ Instagram account (M = 2.47) perceived similar levels of 
persuasive intent (t(171) = 1.91, n.s.). 
In terms of affective responses, respondents who viewed TSA’s Instagram account 
(M = 2.04) reported weaker positive emotions than those who viewed Reynolds Kitchens’ 
Instagram account (M = 2.71, t(173) = 4.48, p < 0.001), lending support to H1. 
As predicted by H2, respondents who viewed TSA’s Instagram account (M = 1.81) did 
indeed feel stronger negative emotions than those who viewed Reynolds Kitchens’ Insta-
gram account (M = 1.36, t(173) = –3.55, p < 0.001). 
 
Impact of content assessment and affective response on attitudes and behavior 
To investigate the impact of content evaluations of and affective reactions to TSA’s Insta-
gram account on attitudes toward the TSA and communicative action regarding TSA’s ac-
count, two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were run. The analyses were 
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restricted to the respondents who viewed TSA’s Instagram account. The results are re-
ported in Table 1, where Model I shows the effects on attitudes toward the TSA, and Model 
II shows the effects on communicative action regarding TSA’s Instagram account. 
 
Table 1. The effects of content assessment and affective response on attitudes toward the TSA and 
communicative action regarding TSA’s Instagram account 
 
Model I TSA attitude  Model II TSA behavior 
B 
(S.E.) β 
 B 
(S.E.) β 
Perceived usefulness of content 0.817*** 
(0.149) 
0.496  0.745*** 
(0.144) 
0.472 
Perceived persuasive intent of 
     content 
–0.445** 
(0.160) 
–0.254  0.136 
(0.153) 
0.081 
Positive emotions 0.181 
(0.161) 
0.1  0.231 
(0.154) 
0.133 
Negative emotions 0.484* 
(0.187) 
0.239  0.538** 
(0.179) 
0.281 
Constant 0.902 
(0.642) 
  –10.744 
(0.610) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.397***   0.385***  
n 85   86  
Note: Entries are coefficients from hierarchical OLS regression analysis. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Content assessment and affective reactions explained a significant amount of the vari-
ance in both attitudes toward the TSA (F(4, 80) = 14.82, p < 0.001, adjusted R2 = 0.40) and 
communicative action regarding TSA’s Instagram account (F(4, 81) = 14.31, p < 0.001, ad-
justed R2 = 0.39). 
Consistent with H3a and H3b, perceived usefulness of content was positively associated 
with attitudes (b = 0.82, SE = 0.15, β = 0.50, p < 0.001) and communicative action (b = 0.75, 
SE = 0.14, β = 0.47, p < 0.001). Perceived persuasive intent of content was negatively associ-
ated with attitudes (b = –0.45, SE = 0.16, β = –0.25, p < 0.01), supporting H4a, but not with 
communicative action (b = 0.14, SE = 0.15, β = 0.08, n.s.), failing to support H4b. 
In terms of affective responses, positive emotions were not associated with either atti-
tudes (b = 0.18, SE = 0.16, β = 0.10, n.s.) or communicative action (b = 0.23, SE = 0.15, β = 0.13, 
n.s.). Neither H5a nor H5b is supported. 
Lastly, negative emotions were positively associated with both attitudes (b = 0.48, SE = 
0.19, β = 0.24, p < 0.05) and communicative action (b = 0.54, SE = 0.18, β = 0.28, p < 0.01), 
supporting H6a and H6b. 
 
Discussion 
 
This study examined the effectiveness of government use of VSNSs, choosing TSA’s Insta-
gram account as a case. The findings indicate that government and nongovernment Insta-
gram accounts indeed induced different levels of affective responses. More importantly, 
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certain content strategies and emotions were more likely to influence attitudes toward the 
TSA and communicative action regarding the TSA’s Instagram account. 
It is interesting to note that those who viewed the TSA’s Instagram account and those 
who viewed Reynolds Kitchens’ Instagram account did not see differences in the useful-
ness or persuasive intent of the content. The chances are that neither account provides con-
tent that is instrumental to the public’s everyday life. Images of confiscated weapons on 
TSA’s account do not matter much to the larger public who are not frequent flyers. Even 
among those who are frequent flyers, few are likely to carry weapons to the airport by 
accident, and therefore the content is similarly of little instrumental value to them. The 
Reynolds Kitchens account largely shows pictures of dishes, some made using Reynolds 
products such as aluminum foil. The descriptions to the images shown in the experiment 
provided only dish names and essential ingredients without showing full recipes. As a 
result, the public may find the content to be of similar practical use and persuasive intent. 
As predicted, those who viewed TSA’s Instagram account did experience weaker posi-
tive emotions and stronger negative emotions than those who viewed the Reynolds Kitch-
ens’ account. This is not surprising, as most of the images shown on TSA’s account are 
confiscated weapons. While the content is also intended to be interesting,30 the pictures 
elicited mostly negative emotions. 
This study did not differentiate between various types of images. Arguably, the puppy 
images on TSA’s account can elicit strong positive emotions and weak negative emotions. 
To increase the external validity of the study, the TSA stimulus materials showed a mixture 
of images as actual followers of its Instagram account would see. 
Content assessment and affective responses matter because they can influence attitudes 
and behavior. 
More specifically, providing useful content to the public leads to more favorable attitu-
dinal and behavioral outcomes. For those who viewed the TSA account, the more useful 
they found the content, the more positive attitudes they held toward the TSA. Moreover, 
they were also more likely to follow and comment on the TSA account as well as to recom-
mend the TSA account to others. Hence, the public information model is indeed a relevant 
and helpful practice for government agencies to adopt. 
On the other hand, when viewers perceived they were being advertised to and per-
suaded by the TSA, they were likely to hold more negative attitudes toward the agency. 
This is consistent with reactance theory, which argues that when the public feels its free-
dom to make independent judgments is threatened, it will work to regain that freedom.90 
Hence, social media managers of government agencies need to make sure the information 
does not come off as advertising or explicit persuasive messages. Perceived persuasive in-
tent of messages, however, was not correlated with communicative actions regarding the 
TSA account. 
Lastly, in terms of affective influence, only negative emotions had consequences for sub-
sequent attitudinal and behavioral change. Interestingly, individuals who felt stronger 
negative emotions after seeing TSA’s Instagram content held more positive attitudes to-
ward the TSA. This may be a unique scenario for the TSA as the strong negative emotions, 
such as fear, fright, or nervousness, resulting from seeing images of weapons could lead 
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to a satisfactory assessment of the TSA because the agency prevented more potential vio-
lence from happening on aircraft. This evaluation can lead to a positive attitude toward 
the agency. 
Individuals who felt stronger negative emotions after seeing TSA’s Instagram accounts 
were also more likely to follow and comment on the TSA account as well as to recommend 
the TSA account to others. This is not surprising, as the negative emotions experienced 
following exposure to TSA’s Instagram account were high-arousal emotions, which tend 
to stimulate behavior. Seeing threatening images of weapons triggers a defense mechanism 
in the body, which motivates defensive behavior to disarm the threat. 
Positive emotions, on the other hand, were not associated with either attitudes or be-
havior regarding the TSA. It is possible that in spite of the high-arousal positive emotions 
experienced, they did not affect evaluations of the attitude objective, the TSA. Some studies 
have also shown that emotional state will not influence evaluation when the object being 
evaluated is highly familiar and for which past evaluations exist in memory,91,92 which may 
be the case with the TSA. In comparison, the negative emotions may be of higher diagnos-
tic value than positive emotions for TSA followers.93 
This study is not without weaknesses. 
For one, this experiment focuses on very unique, specific cases, raising the concern 
about generalizability. The choice of the TSA’s Instagram as a case of government VSNS is 
a deliberate and strategic one because the agency suffers low favorability ratings among 
the US public, and its Instagram account aims to improve public attitudes toward the 
agency. The content on its account is arguably unique to its agency functions: clearly, other 
government accounts will not be populated by weapons and dogs. Similarly, the compar-
ison condition, Reynolds Kitchens, is also unique in and of itself. Its content consists of 
images of dishes and ingredients. Using the account of another government agency or pri-
vate business may yield different results. 
This limitation underscores the fact the best practices for social media marketing are 
highly contextualized. Magro echoes this sentiment by claiming that “the ‘best’ way to use 
social media in government is a nebulous and subjective problem that does not lend itself 
to a single set of guidelines for every task, country, agency, citizen, and government.”94 
Another limitation of this study concerns the sample in the regression analyses. The 
models testing the impact of content assessment and affective responses on attitude and 
behavior were estimated among the respondents who were assigned to the TSA’s Insta-
gram condition in the experiment. These respondents were shown a screenshot of part of 
the actual content on TSA’s account. The respondents, however, were not able to zoom in 
on the images, comment on the content, or view previous pictures. They viewed the con-
tent only once during the experiment. Viewers of the actual account may have different 
user experiences. 
Despite these limitations, this study fills the gap in the literature on government use of 
VSNSs. TSA’s Instagram account did not affect public’s assessment of the usefulness or 
persuasive intent of its content differently versus a private consumer product business ac-
count (Reynolds Kitchens). It did elicit stronger emotional reactions, however. More im-
portantly, perceived usefulness of content, perceived persuasive intent of content, and 
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negative emotions all affected attitudes toward the TSA and all but persuasive intent also 
influenced communicative action regarding the TSA account. 
 
Conclusion 
 
These findings demonstrate that, be it weapons or puppies, content strategies matter for 
government communication on social media, which can improve public attitudes toward 
government agencies and enhance public engagement. Government agencies should not 
avoid social media but instead should embrace it strategically. 
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